The classic notion of truthfulness requires that no agent has a profitable manipulation -- an untruthful report that, for some combination of reports of the other agents, increases her utility. This strong notion implicitly assumes that the manipulating agent either knows what all other agents are going to report, or is willing to take the risk and act as-if she knows their reports. Without knowledge of the others' reports, most manipulations are risky -- they might decrease the manipulator's utility for some other combinations of reports by the other agents. Accordingly, a recent paper (Bu, Song and Tao, ``On the existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms'', Artificial Intelligence 319 (2023), 103904) suggests a relaxed notion, which we refer to as risk-avoiding truthfulness (RAT), which requires only that no agent can gain from a safe manipulation -- one that is sometimes beneficial and never harmful. Truthfulness and RAT are two extremes: the former considers manipulators with complete knowledge of others, whereas the latter considers manipulators with no knowledge at all. In reality, agents often know about some -- but not all -- of the other agents. This paper introduces the RAT-degree of a mechanism, defined as the smallest number of agents whose reports, if known, may allow another agent to safely manipulate, or $n$ if there is no such number. This notion interpolates between classic truthfulness (degree $n$) and RAT (degree at least $1$): a mechanism with a higher RAT-degree is harder to manipulate safely. To illustrate the generality and applicability of this concept, we analyze the RAT-degree of prominent mechanisms across various social choice settings, including auctions, indivisible goods allocations, cake-cutting, voting, and stable matchings.

With the advancements of artificial intelligence (AI), we're seeing more scenarios that require AI to work closely with other agents, whose goals and strategies might not be known beforehand. However, existing approaches for training collaborative agents often require defined and known reward signals and cannot address the problem of teaming with unknown agents that often have latent objectives/rewards. In response to this challenge, we propose teaming with unknown agents framework, which leverages kernel density Bayesian inverse learning method for active goal deduction and utilizes pre-trained, goal-conditioned policies to enable zero-shot policy adaptation. We prove that unbiased reward estimates in our framework are sufficient for optimal teaming with unknown agents. We further evaluate the framework of redesigned multi-agent particle and StarCraft II micromanagement environments with diverse unknown agents of different behaviors/rewards. Empirical results demonstrate that our framework significantly advances the teaming performance of AI and unknown agents in a wide range of collaborative scenarios.